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ABSTRACT 
With the euro-crisis of the year 2011 threatening to fracture the European Union, the 
timing may seem wrong for makers of policy and sailors to imagine a unitary European 
Navy within a comprehensive European defense policy.  But as Europeans explore the 
limits of economic and financial harmony in the EU and NATO amid financial distress, 
they may embrace European integration in the defense sector, especially in its maritime 
dimension.  The ongoing global and regional budget crises demand that responsible 
governments seek cost savings where they can; a unified European security and defense 
structure certainly would eliminate redundancies and spread the burden of regional 
defense more evenly among member states.  In addition, though, the European Union and 
NATO could leverage the incremental, but steady progress toward a unified defense 
structure to bolster the European project at this sensitive moment.  If the European Union 
puts in place the few remaining policy commitments that would create a single European 
Navy—hardly the stuff of fantasy fiction these days, in light of several recent 
initiatives—its internal and external unity would be stronger. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
With the euro-crisis of the year 2011 threatening to fracture the European Union, the 
timing may seem wrong for makers of policy and sailors to imagine a unitary European 
Navy within a comprehensive European defense policy.  But as Europeans explore the 
limits of economic and financial harmony in the EU and NATO amid financial distress, 
they may embrace European integration in the defense sector, especially in its maritime 
dimension.  The ongoing global and regional budget crises demand that responsible 
governments seek cost savings where they can; a unified European security and defense 
structure certainly would eliminate redundancies and spread the burden of regional 
defense more evenly among member states.  In addition, though, the European Union and 
NATO could leverage the incremental, but steady progress toward a unified defense 
structure to bolster the European project at this sensitive moment.  If the European Union 
puts in place the few remaining policy commitments that would create a single European 
Navy—hardly the stuff of fantasy fiction these days, in light of several recent 
initiatives—its internal and external unity would be stronger. 
This thesis examines the project of a European Navy in context of a potential 
catalyzing step that could complete European integration while simultaneously 
solidifying a European identity. On the one hand, France and Britain in a bilateral 
arrangement of 2010 attempted to build a joint aircraft carrier, a move that might have 
laid the foundation for an all-European Navy centered on these two major naval partners. 
In the end, for reasons this thesis will investigate, the Franco-British carrier was 
unsuccessful.  On the other hand, the model for a different kind of European Navy 
operations is already in place with the advent of EU Naval Forces (EU NAVFOR) 
Somalia.  EU NAVFOR in 2012 is operating in the Horn of Africa combating piracy with 
contributions of personnel and material from those countries that are willing to provide 
resources to do so, based on a percentage of their gross domestic product.  EU NAVFOR 
Somalia is completely voluntary and is an example of successful European military 
integration across a broader range of states.  Can this model be expanded?  It is a short 
step, institutionally, and, in fact, the bureaucratic way has been laid by the European 
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Space Agency (ESA).  ESA also operates on a pay-as-you-go basis, allowing greater and 
smaller powers, alike, to share the prestige (as well as the formidable costs) of space 
projects.  In this regard, the space agency represents a promising comparison for a 
proposed naval undertaking.  As the following pages make clear, while Europe has 
successful organizations that already have achieved extremely high levels of integration, 
a European Navy could help the EU achieve greater internal unity and greater security at 
the same time.  
A. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Initially, this thesis provides a background of various European organizations and 
their attempt to integrate Europe.  Chapter II provides the logic and benefits of creating a 
European Navy.  Chapter III outlines historically how these various organization and 
alliances used politics, economics, and defense integration to bring members closer in 
these realms and, ultimately, to establish a European identity.  Chapter IV demonstrates 
present-day failures and successes in the project of European naval integration.  The first 
case study, the Franco-British carrier, demonstrates that a successful effort cannot 
proceed on a bilateral basis between the EU’s bigger powers alone.  In contrast, the 
second case study, EU anti-piracy efforts in the Indian Ocean, illustrates that when all 
European Union countries are involved, the likelihood for success is increased. Chapter V 
provides the blueprint for a European Navy using an ESA-like model for the 
development and maintenance of those forces.  This chapter also briefly highlights why 
integration and development of a European identity is so important and concludes that the 
European Union, with a European Navy, is heading in the right direction regarding 
European integration.  Ultimately, this thesis posits that a unitary European Navy can and 
will emerge as a considerable and legitimate unified force for regional defense and global 
security. 
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B. WHY EUROPEAN INTEGRATION? 
At least since the Schuman Declaration in 1950, which inaugurated the European 
Coal and Steel Community,1 economics has led the European integration effort, with all 
other sectors, including defense, swept along in its wake.  The European Defense 
Community effort of the years 1950–1954 looms as a forgotten episode of the path not 
taken in European integration at an early date.   Today with the significant rifts in the 
euro zone and the economic instability of Europe, further economic integration—to say 
nothing of financial integration—has lost its appeal in many European capitals beset by a 
populist backlash to the single currency and enlargement of the EU.  In contrast, among 
many European states, including the largest powers in the Union, continued 
synchronization and even integration in the security and defense sector remains plausible, 
even desirable because of budget cutting in the financial crisis.  In these economic straits, 
the leading nations of Europe may well find themselves at the edge of a momentous 
change in their military and defense structures: a unitary, supranational European 
military.  While some more conspicuous efforts have gone into integrating Europe’s land 
forces, the time may soon be right—politically, economically, culturally, and 
strategically—for an EU Navy.  
Since the end of World War II, Western Europe has relied heavily on the United 
States directly and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for regional defense 
as well as in engagements beyond the European continent.  To be sure, Europe also has 
attempted to achieve collective defense that did not involve the United States through 
such organizations as the European Defense Community (EDC), Western European 
Union (WEU) and currently the European Union.  In 1999, the EU took a major step 
toward military integration with the advent of the European Security and Defense Policy  
 
 
                                                 
1 Robert Schuman was the French Foreign Minister in 1950 that proposed and advocated for the ECSC 
to control the production and distribution of coal and steel, the two key products used to wage war. 
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(ESDP).2  On both sides of the Atlantic, the question, in various formulations,3 has been 
how much a stronger European force would contribute to regional defense and global 
security—and how much duplication or competition it might engender. 
In the fiscally constrained environment of 2012, many European countries must 
tackle the difficult question of how to allocate most effectively their limited resources for 
national defense while maintaining an effective and competent military force.  The 
calculus is particularly tricky in light of the diffuse threats of the post–Cold-War world, 
as well as such issues as prolonged engagements well beyond the national or regional 
borders, coalition operations, and the changing roles of the military.  The United States is 
struggling with the very same questions. These circumstances lend a particular urgency—
and charm—to the idea of a more fully functional, integrated European military.  
Especially with global missions amid dwindling resources, a European Navy may well 
provide the most bang, literally and figuratively, for the euro.   
In the end, both Europe and the United States would benefit.  The United States 
would be able to allocate more resources at home or to other areas of crisis, without 
leaving Europe under-defended or unable to participate in global security missions.  Also 
the United States would benefit because an integrated European military, in particular a 
Navy, could assist in providing presence and security in the region and around the world.  
The U.S. Navy is already spread far too thin and struggling to fulfill its global 
requirements while protecting the thousands of sea lines of communications (SLOCS).  
For its part, Europe would benefit for having a more substantial role in security in and 
around Europe, embedded in a truly European security and defense policy.  The 
individual EU member states would enjoy a comprehensive and complete defense 
structure, perhaps even more effective and cost-efficient than is possible with the current 
lineup of distinct national militaries.  Moreover, a European Navy could help achieve and 
                                                 
2 ESDP is now referred to as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) under the Lisbon 
Treaty of 2007. 
3 The concept of burden sharing and the potential future role of the EU are discussed in Wallace Thies, 
Friendly rivals : Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2003) and Nicole 
Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi, The New Global Puzzle: What World for the EU in 2025? (European Union 
Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2006), respectively. 
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instill a European identity while simultaneously assisting the United States more as equal 
partners.  The unique present conditions are potentially ideal to bring Europe closer 
together, in this case under the flag of a unified European Navy. 
C. ISSUES SURROUNDING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
Several practical problems of politics, operational issues, and economics stand 
between Europe as it is arranged today and a truly integrated military: 
1. How do twenty-seven different member states of the European Union 
agree on what is best for the whole of Europe?  Each region and state has 
its own perceived threats and therefore its own associated priorities and 
preferences.  A (more) unified Europe must identify common universal 
threats.  If consensus cannot be established on threats, collective defense 
will never occur.4   
2. If the European Union is going to play a larger role on the world stage as a 
military power, how is it going to overcome its planning and command 
and control shortfalls?  Currently the European Union leans greatly on 
NATO and its resources at all levels to conduct military operations.5  A 
truly autonomous European defense presence requires truly autonomous 
capabilities—though the EU will want to account for its partners’ 
circumstances, especially the United States, as it strives for recognition 
and acceptance as its own military power. 
3. The European Union must determine how to deal with countries in Europe 
that are not members of the European Union.  Such countries as 
Switzerland, Croatia, and Turkey most likely will be apprehensive about 
other countries attempting to dictate strategy and policy in their state.  For 
                                                 
4 Toje Asle, The EU, NATO, and European Defence – A slow train coming, in Occasional Paper, no. 
74 (European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2008). 
5 Luis Simón, Command and control?  Planning for EU military operations, in Occasional Paper No 
81 (European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2010). 
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the European Union to be successful in uniting Europe and providing 
collective defense, the non-members will have to be addressed.   
D. IDEAS AND VISIONS OF EUROPE 
Over the past six decades, a long list of books, articles, and various other 
publications have been written discussing European defense integration and why it will or 
will not work.  The vast majority of the literature does not specifically address the impact 
of the financial crisis of 2007 on European defense integration, because events are too 
fresh for scholarship of this kind.  The scholarship and journalism on the topic today 
focus on cutbacks and draw-downs in the short term, rather than exploring the options for 
truly innovative reform.  Currently, there is no literature that specifically discusses the 
benefits of a European Navy and its importance. 
One helpful strand of scholarship focuses on the role or reaction of the United 
States vis-à-vis Europe and its integration schemes.  This literature can easily be placed 
into three categories: (1) the so-called two-world view—Europe and United States 
develop as separate and (more or less) equal; (2) the one-world view—Europe and United 
States continue to mesh Western security and defense together; and (3) the uncertain 
view—Europe must provide but analysts are unsure if it can.6  
The first category encompasses the “two-world view,” based on the idea that 
Europeans can provide for themselves without the undue influence of another country or 
organization, such as the United States or NATO, respectively.  The two-world view 
contends that Europe is an equal player with the United States in the world and can 
provide for its own security and defense autonomy.  Contained within the two-world 
view are those scholars who believe European defense integration is well on its way and 
succeeding with the advent of CSDP and the Lisbon Treaty.  The following authors  
 
 
                                                 
6 The categorization of the literature in this proposal derives from the typology of trans-Atlantic views 
that appears in John L. Harper, American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, 
and Dean G. Acheson (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
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Esther Brimmer and Stefan Frölich,7 Hall Gardner,8 Fraser Cameron,9 Geoffrey L. 
Williams and Alan L. Williams,10 basically supports the belief that Europe and the 
European Union is, or will be depending on when the book was written, a key player on 
the world stage.  J. Weiler, Iain Begg and John Peterson,11 and T.R. Reid,12 as well as 
Schnabel and Rocca,13 take the two-world literature one step farther believing that 
Europe is going to be a strategic superpower that will challenge the United States.  The 
main focus of these works contends that the European Union will work aside from NATO 
and act in the best interests of Europe as a whole, without the influence of the United 
States. 
Alternately, there is the literature that holds to the one-world line.  The one-world 
view basically contends that the United States must be involved in European affairs and 
help provide security and defense within Europe via NATO.  Most of the literature within 
this view believe that the European Union plays more of an economic role and less of a 
military role.  The one-world view relies almost exclusively on NATO because the 
European Union is unable to provide adequate security within Europe.  The European 
Union is seen as having no real legitimate military presence, aside from routine  
 
 
                                                 
7 Esther Brimmer and Stefan Frohlich, The Strategic Implications of European Union Enlargement 
(Washington, DC: The Johns Hopkins University, 2005). 
8 Hall Gardner, NATO and the European Union New World, New Europe, New Threats (Burlington, 
VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004). 
9 Fraser Cameron, The Future of Europe Integration and Enlargement (New York, NY: Routledge, 
2004.) and The Foreign and Security Policy of the Europe Union (Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 1999). 
10 Geoffrey L. Williams and Alan L Williams, The European Defence Initiative (New York, NY: San 
Martin’s Press, 1986). 
11 Andrew Moravcsik, “Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union” in Integration in an 
expanding European Union : Reassessing the fundamentals ed. Joseph H.H. Weiler, Iain Begg, and John 
Peterson (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2003). 
12 T.R. Reid, The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy 
(New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2005). 
13 Rockwell Schnabel and Francis Rocca, The next superpower?: The rise of Europe and its challenge 
to the United States (Lanham, MD: Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005) 
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peacekeeping operations.  Such authors as Stanley Sloan,14 Richard Youngs,15 Asle 
Toje,16 and Florian Trauner17 have done considerable scholarly research attempting to 
prove the point that Europe is unable to provide for its own security.  These authors 
essentially believe that NATO, not the EU, ultimately will remain the security guarantor 
for Europe and not the European Union. 
Contained within the one-world view are also those authors who discuss the role 
of NATO and the importance of the transatlantic link between the United States and 
Europe.  Authors such as Wallace Thies,18 Ian Q. R. Thomas,19 Ronald D. Asmus,20 
Alexandra Gheciu,21 and Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen and Allen G. Sens22 do not 
specifically address the role of the European Union in security and collective defense but 
rather focus on NATO’s role in Europe.  These authors more or less assume that NATO 
will be the security provider in Europe hence they fall into the one-world view.  “The 
future of the North Atlantic Alliance, and also of the NATO-CSDP framework, is of 
paramount importance to the EU common foreign and security policy…The Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) specifically provides for compatibility with NATO membership, 
stating that the common security and defence policy of the Union shall respect the 
                                                 
14 Stanley Sloan, NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic 
Bargain Reconsidered (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009). 
15 Richard Youngs, Europe’s Decline and Fall, The Struggle Against Global Irrelevance (Great 
Britain, UK: Profile Books Ltd, 2010). 
16 Asle Toje, The European Union as a Small Power After the Post-Cold War (New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) and Asle, Toje, The EU, NATO, and European Defence – A slow train coming, 
in Occasional Paper no. 74 (European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2008). 
17 Florian Trauner, The Internal-external Security Nexus: More Coherence Under Lisbon, in 
Occasional Paper no. 89 (European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2011). 
18 Wallace Thies, Friendly rivals : bargaining and burden-shifting in NATO (Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2003). 
19 Ian Q.R. Thomas, The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 1997). 
20 Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era (New 
York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2002). 
21 Alexandra Gheciu, NATO in the “New Europe”: The Politics of International Socialization After 
the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
22 Allen G. Sens, “The Widening Atlantic, Part II: Transatlanticism, the New NATO, and Canada,” in 
NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism, ed. 
Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen, and Allen G. Sens (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003). 
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obligations of certain Member States, which under the North Atlantic Treaty and be 
compatible with common security and defence policy established within that 
framework.”23  The main gap in the literature of the one-world view is the impact that the 
financial crisis has had on the United States and NATO and the role the European Union 
is attempting to play. 
The last group of scholarly work neither falls into the one-world or the two-view.  
These authors are uncertain who will ultimately provide defense and security within 
Europe.  The only certainty, they believe, is that the European Union is going to play 
more of a role Europe but are uncertain exactly how they will achieve that role.  Ariella 
Huff,24 Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi,25 Luis Simón,26 Wolfgang Wagner27 and 
Nicole Gnesotto et al.28 subscribe to the opinion that the European Union is poised to 
become a more recognized and legitimate organization within Europe and beyond, but 
they realize that with its present organizational structure the European Union is not ready.   
The EU can hardly be expected to bring further added value if its Member 
States refrain from engaging in serious political debate on what they want 
to do together, and if they are reluctant to put their money and resources 
where their mouth is.  That requires first and foremost that national 
political establishments change gear, and switch their discourse on foreign 
and security policy from a national to a European level.29   
                                                 
23 Sven Biscop, Nicole Gnesotto, Jolyon Howorth, Daniel Keohane, Stefano Silvestri, and Teija 
Tiilikainen, What do Europeans want from NATO?, in Report no. 8 (European Union Institute for Security 
Studies [ISS], 2010), 4. 
24 Ariella Huff, The Role of EU Defence Policy in the Eastern Neighborhood, in Occasional Paper no. 
91 (European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2011). 
25 Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi, The New Global Puzzle: What World for the EU in 2025? 
(European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2006). 
26 Luis Simón, Command and Control? Planning for EU Military Operations, in Occasional Paper no. 
81 (European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2010). 
27 Wolfgang Wagner, The Democratic Legitimacy of European Security and Defence Policy, in 
Occasional Paper no. 57 (European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2005). 
28 Nicole Gnesotto, Jean-Yves Haine, André Dumoulin, Jan Foghelin, Francois Heisbourg, William 
Hopkinson, Marc Otte, Tomas Ries, Lothar Rühl, Stefano Silvestri, Hans-Bernhard Weisserth and Rob de 
Wijk, European Defence, A Proposal for a White Paper (European Union Institute for Security Studies 
(ISS) 2004). 
29 Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi, The New Global Puzzle: What World for the EU in 2025?, 
(European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS], 2006), 207. 
 10
These authors understand that the United States and NATO will not always be able to 
provide security and defense within Europe, and the ensuing gap could potentially be 
filled by the EU. 
This thesis contends that the successful way forward for Europe is to be found the 
two-world view, though the observations and critiques of the other views merit serious 
attention, as well. The European Union, through the use of integrated military structures, 
can bring Europe together.  Countries not currently members of the European Union 
could be lured into the union rooted in the idea of a European national identity reinforced 
by integrated military structures.  Integrated military structures benefit all involved in 
some form or fashion.  At the end of the day, the European Union will fill the void soon 
to be left by NATO.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Two case studies illustrate the impact that the current state and future promise of 
European defense integration.  The first case study is the attempt of the year 2010 by 
France and Britain to work together to create an aircraft carrier that will service both 
countries.  The idea was that both nations could deploy, land, and conduct operations 
with their respective aircraft from the joint platform.  In the end, this bilateral effort failed 
to a large extent because it did not include the other EU countries.  That is, in its concept 
and execution, the Franco-British carrier was insufficiently European to succeed.   
In contrast, the integrated military structure of European Union Naval Forces 
Somalia has posted consisted successes in conducting anti-piracy operations of the coast 
of Africa.  With every country in the European Union contributing resources based on a 
percentage of its gross domestic product, there is relative equality and participation, 
which is a large part of its success.  This model has much to say about next steps for a 
broader EU defense organization.   
The analytical emphasis falls on various European Union Institute for Security 
Studies documents discussing the role and future of the European Union with respect to 
defense and security.  In addition numerous books and articles will provide insight into 
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the role of NATO and why the European Union will become an equal player to the 
United States.  Despite the blow to integration that the Eurozone crisis seems to have 
delivered, Europe’s success rests on creating integrated military structures starting with a 
European Navy.   
European integration has been the ultimate goal of many European countries since 
the idea of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the late 1940s.  
Integration efforts have been driven by such underlying factors as politics, economics, 
and defense integration, all of which will be discussed in more detail in the following 
chapters.  In an attempt to push integration forward two countries within the EU, France 
and Britain, attempted to lead the way through a bi-lateral agreement to invest in aircraft 
carriers.  While the bilateral agreement had good intentions the general execution was 
flawed.  Why the bilateral agreement failed and what a successful European Navy would 
look like and the benefits that could be brought to Europe will be discussed later.  
Ultimately Europe stands to benefit tremendously from the development a European 
Navy.  A European Navy could be the backbone of the development of a complete and 
functional European identity that could bring together politics and economics while 
leading the way in defense integration.  In the end, a European Navy can be used as a 
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II. WHY A EUROPEAN NAVY? 
 The definition of a superpower is an entity: 
that has the capacity to project dominating power and influence anywhere 
in the world, and sometimes, in more than one region of the globe at a 
time, and so may plausibly attain the status of global hegemon. The basic 
components of superpower stature may be measured along four axes of 
power: military, economic, political, and cultural.30   
The focus here will be on the military axis because it has elements of the other three and 
directly involves the Navy.  The axis of military power is only as strong as its maritime 
component.  This claim particularly holds true if the ocean encircles the superpower.  
Stated differently: 
Maritime power has a unique combination of attributes.  It operates in the 
medium that covers over two thirds of the world’s surface and which gives 
access at a range of no more than a hundred miles to a similar proportion 
of the world’s population.  Maritime strategy exploits these attributes to 
achieve political objectives.  The ability to execute a maritime strategy—
one that must by definition be joint but rests on an ability to operate on, 
over, under and from the sea—is therefore one of a nation’s most useful 
and powerful assets, especially in that nation is surrounded by the ocean.31 
 The creation of a EU Navy would force consolidation of efforts regarding 
collective defense while aiding in maritime domain awareness.  The maritime 
environment is unlike any other in that the effects of globalization are felt the most.   
The oceans have effectively been globalized for over a century—that is, 
their use as what Alfred Thayer Mahan would call “the great common” 
has been open to all nations with the desire, access, and resources to 
 





                                                 
30 Lyman Miller, “China an Emerging Superpower?,” Stanford Journal of International Relations 6 
no. 1 (Winter 2005), http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjir/6.1.03_miller.html (accessed May 15, 2012). 
31 Eric Grove, “Principles of Maritime Strategy,” in Dimensions of Seapower: Strategic choice in the 
Modern World, eds. Eric Grove and Peter Hore (Hull, UK: The University of Hull Press,1998), 31. 
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recent parlance, a root cause—of globalization because it is the medium 
by which 90 percent of world trade (when measured by weight and 
volume) is transported.32  
Europe has a vested interest in developing a Maritime Strategy that will aid in protecting 
shipping in and around Europe.  Alfred Thayer Mahan stated, “The use and control of the 
sea is and has been a great factor in the history of the world.”33 With the creation of a 
European Navy, the European Union could provide for freedom of the seas in and around 
Europe while simultaneously shaping history around the European continent. There are 
numerous benefits for Europe through the development of a supranational navy, the main 
ones of which are featured in the pages that follow. 
A. BLUE WATER CAPABILITY—SEA CONTROL 
Most countries in Europe that currently have their own respective navies are 
considered to be Coastal Powers.  That is to say they are a “small or medium-sized state 
situated by the ocean.  Among the major sources of its wealth and political influence are 
the resources in its economic zones, on its continental shelf or in its coastal waters.”  Also 
for various reasons, these Coastal Powers have elected not to develop or invest in a blue 
water navy “beyond the reach of its own shore-based aviation or surface-to-surface 
missile systems.  It cannot therefore challenge or compete with Naval Powers on the high 
seas.”34  
With the establishment of a blue water navy there is a certain implied connotation 
of power. According to the dictionary one definition of power is “the capacity or ability 
to direct or influence the behavior of others or the course of events.”  Europe is currently 
comprised of too many smaller nation states and would be unable to counter larger naval 
powers such as North Korea and China. 
                                                 
32 Sam J. Tangredi, “Introduction,” in Globalization and Maritime Power, ed. Sam J. Tangredi 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2002), xxvi. 
33 Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660–1783 (Mineola, NY: Dover 
Publications Inc., 1987), iii. 
34 Jacob Børresen, “The Seapower of the Coastal State,” in Seapower: Theory and Practice, ed. 
Geoffrey Till (Portland, OR: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1994), 149.  
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The primary task of seapower [ie—blue water navy] has traditionally been 
to protect merchant shipping (and fisheries), to protect the freedom of the 
Seas whereby the seaborne trade can go on unhindered.  Second, the 
establishment of sea control outside the coasts of an opponent, enables the 
Naval Power to exert force across the coastline of that opponent.35  
In 2010, roughly 1.8 billion tonnes of freight, 847 million tonnes of liquid bulk 
cargo, 341 million tonnes of dry bulk cargo, 290 million tonnes of goods transported in 
roll on–roll off vessels, and 213 million tonnes in containers were shipped between the 
main twenty-seven EU ports via merchant vessels.36  Europe can ill afford to have such a 
key artery disrupted.  European countries are going to have no choice but to attempt 
collective blue water operations.  If they do not, then they risk succumbing to the political 
and economic influence of others.  Moreover, a Europe comprised of several more or less 
coordinated but independent national navies will not be able to project its own might on 
or beyond the high seas.  Conversely, a thoroughly maritime Europe would include new 
and important ways for the coastal states to contribute to the regional project—a category 
that includes all of the present-day “problem states,” namely Greece, Spain, Italy, and 
Ireland. 
A blue water navy is the hallmark and prerogative of the most powerful polities 
on earth in no small part because of the steep costs associated with creating and 
maintaining a blue water navy.  One solution for Europe is to create a supranational navy 
where respective EU defense budgets are pooled, like in NATO,37 sharing the cost for 
creating and maintaining a blue water navy.    
                                                 
35 Jacob Børresen, “The Seapower of the Coastal State,” in Seapower: Theory and Practice, ed. 
Geoffrey Till (Portland, OR: Frank Cass & Co., 1994), 154. 
36 Statistics were obtained from EUROSTAT website provided by the European Commission at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Maritime_transport_statistics_-
_short_sea_shipping_of_goods (accessed on May 21, 2012). 
37 The concept of pooling and sharing resources and capabilities is discussed in detail in Wallace 
Thies, Friendly rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003).  One 
condition for acceptance into NATO is providing an agreed upon percentage of the repspective countries 
GDP for NATO defense spending. 
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B. DEVELOPMENT OF CONSOLIDATED EU MARITIME STRATEGY 
The effects of globalization can be felt throughout Europe as countries become 
more dependent on one another.  Nonetheless, there is still no consolidated EU Maritime 
Strategy.  The next-closest thing would be CSDP, which is vague at best on the issue of 
naval strategy.  As such, Europe requires a unified EU Maritime Strategy to create and 
sustain a EU naval “presence and intervention in locations not previously considered of 
vital interest…[while simultaneously creating] new, unpredicted effects on alliances and 
coalition-formation and their maritime components.”38   Focus of the strategy would 
center on concepts such as stability, security, and seapower.   There must be a unity of 
effort by the various EU countries.  The United States currently provides presence in 
numerous international shipping lanes ensuring freedom of the seas.  With a EU Navy 
operating under one strategy, they could share the burden with the United States.  Europe 
would then be able to establish bilateral agreements with the United States where there is 
concept of equality vice dependence.  The overall situation would create a win-win for 
Europe and the United States.  Europe establishes a navy that can protect and provide for 
itself while simultaneously sharing the burden of international security with the United 
States.  
C. EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS 
Expeditionary operations are “Military Operations which can be initiated at short 
notice, consisting of forward deployed or rapidly deployable self-sustaining forces 
tailored to achieve a clearly stated objective in a foreign country.”39 The first part of the 
definition calls for short notice and rapidly deployable forces.  Currently, the EU does not 
have ships that can quickly be deployed for operations because each individual nation-
state in Europe controls its respective military forces.  The persistence of the nation-state 
slows the process.  The EU is structured in a way that allows for a respective country to 
decide to opt out of a given conflict.  As an example, the 2003 Iraq War illustrated how 
                                                 
38 Sam J. Tangredi, “Introduction,” in Globalization and Maritime Power, ed. Sam J. Tangredi 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2002), xxix. 
39 Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, (Portland, OR: Frank Cass 
Publishers, 2004), 235. 
 17
some countries such as the United Kingdom were willing to provide troops whereas 
others like Germany and France were not.  The EU as a whole was unable to provide 
expeditionary forces collectively with effective logistical support.  If the EU was 
integrated militarily, the response could have been more effective and unified among 
European countries.  
Creating a European Navy would allow for EU member states’ navy vessels to 
fall under the control of a higher European authority with designated officials.  This 
command and control architecture, in theory, would streamline the deployment process in 
support of European interests allowing Europe to undertake Expeditionary Operations.  
The other part of the definition to Expeditionary Operations calls for self-
sustaining forces to achieve a clearly stated objective in a foreign country.  Looking at the 
U.S. Navy as an example, one of the biggest advantages is its ability to sustain 
Expeditionary Operations for long periods of time without having to redeploy additional 
forces.  The United States waged the 1991 Gulf War and in the 2003 invasion of Iraq 
with no lulls or gaps because of this ability.  While the face of those operations was the 
United States Army, success would not have been possible without the continued Naval 
Gun Fire Support (NGFS) as well as logistical support.  Ground forces rely heavily on 
naval forces for logistical support as well as fire support.  
 First-hand experience working with European navies at sea has proven that 
sustained naval operations are a considerable challenge for numerous European 
countries.40  In 2008, while deployed with Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) 2, 
European naval ships were only able to operate for five to seven days at sea and then 
needed to pull in.  Another challenge was replenishment at sea.  Many European oilers 
were very small and only able to refuel two ships before they needed to pull into port 
themselves.  Europe’s inability to operate at sea for long periods of time negates the key 
element of Expeditionary Operations—sustainment.    
                                                 
40 From September 2007 to March 2008 the author was deployed to the Mediterranean Sea assigned to 
Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 working for a Turkish 2-Star Admiral.  
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The EU currently relies on the United States too heavily in the fulfillment of 
Expeditionary Operational requirements, as was the case in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The 
2010 National Security Strategy of the United States, signed by President Obama, 
indicates focus will be shifting to the Asia-Pacific Theater with less emphasis on Europe.  
Europe is going to have to invest together to ensure that it will be able to meet potential 
future Expeditionary Operations.   
D. INCREASE AND DEVELOP CAPABILITIES 
There are basic missions that any navy today should be able to accomplish.  These 
missions include Air Warfare, Surface Warfare, Submarine Warfare, and Mine Warfare.  
In order to accomplish these missions a Navy must be comprised of ships like Destroyers, 
Minesweepers, Amphibious Ships, Aircraft Carriers, and Submarines.  Finally, a Navy 
needs aircraft that fall into the following categories: fighters, electronic warfare, 
surveillance, close air support, and numerous helicopter variants.  While this list of 
requirements seems long and expensive, Europe already has all of these capabilities, 
though distributed unevenly among the member states.  Currently, the member states of 
the EU possess 579 surface ships and 58 submarines.41  The United States Navy, by 
comparison, only has 212 surface ships and 71 submarines.  The EU members have more 
than twice the number of ships as the United States!  If these assets were pooled under a 
unitary European Navy Commission, the EU would easily be able to fulfill the required 
force composition and mission sets of a navy.         
First-hand experience again illustrates the need for increasing individual 
European naval capabilities.  While deployed in 2007–2008 in support of Standing 
NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) 2, the participating European countries demonstrated a 
wide range of capabilities. The British and Spanish ships were able to conduct Air 
Defense Exercises (ADEX), whereas the Romanian and Greek ships were unable to 
participate due to radar limitations.42 Moreover, about half of the time, at least one 
                                                 
41 Information on the total number of ships that the twenty-seven EU countries possess was obtained 
from each country’s respective navy website. 
42 While deployed with SNMG-2 I coordinated and participated in approximately twenty ADEX 
events.   
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country was unable to establish secure voice communications due to equipment 
malfunctions or operator error. A unified and unifying European Navy would standardize 
basic equipment and procedures, facilitating effective exercises and coordination with 
other naval units.  
E. CONCLUSION 
With 90 percent of world trade, as measured by weight and volume, traveling by 
water, Europe has a vested interest in protecting and ensuring freedom of the seas around 
Europe.  In order to achieve freedom of the seas however, Europe must establish a robust 
blue water capability.  As such other countries as China and North Korea continue to 
advance their respective naval forces, specifically encompassing blue water operations, 
Europe will have little choice but to work more collectively to keep pace.  By combining 
their respective budgets and forces, Europe could easily establish a blue water capability 
that is the hallmark of powerful nations.   
Once all of Europe’s naval assets are brought together, Europe would then benefit 
through the development of a collective Maritime Strategy.  This Strategy would focus 
the collective’s efforts toward achieving stability, security, and seapower within the EU’s 
given area of responsibility.  By focusing and better coordinating efforts, Europe would 
be able to take on more complex and robust expeditionary operations.  Europe would be 
able to quickly deploy forces for long periods of time ultimately supporting complex 
ground operations, such as those accomplished during the 2003 Iraq War.   
While some European countries are able to accomplish difficult operations and 
exercises with allied countries, such as the United States, some European countries are 
unable to participate for various reasons.  Working together and sharing technology and 
capabilities benefits everyone involved.  Those who have the technology will have the 
burden shared by those who are receiving it.  
 20
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III. FOUNDATIONS: EARLIER INITIATIVES FOR EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION 
 Europe realized very early after World War II that it could not rely solely on the 
United States, through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to provide security in and 
around Europe. Several alliances and organizations43 were founded to provide security in 
and around Europe while simultaneously trying to prevent another war of annihilation in 
Europe—in part through the care and encouragement of new bonds of common identity. 
Early attempts were more rallying calls against communism and were not necessarily 
aimed at complete integration of European political, economic, or defense organizations.  
For example, Winston S. Churchill delivered a speech on September 19, 1946, “calling 
for a United States of Europe…seen as a signal by the leaders of an emerging European 
movement,” by which he meant to distinguish Western Europe from the Soviet-
dominated east and bolster the morale of those states struggling to rebuild after the war.44 
Even these much-quoted words stopped well short of proclaiming a unified Europe as its 
own entity.  Churchill was, after all, a British politician who, like many of his 
countrymen, rejected out of hand a fully “Europeanized” Britain. 
Still, the ideal of integration was built into even the earliest postwar European 
organizations. Although Jean Monnet’s plan for the European Coal and Steel Community 
was famously pragmatic and focused on the workings of a single sector of the economy, 
Monnet himself had long cherished an ideal of political unity in Europe.45 These 
organizations and alliances represent the building blocks for the current design of the 
European Union. 
Although these entities ranged widely in their purpose, function, and composition, 
all of them represented efforts to answer three related questions for (and of) Europe: 
                                                 
43 The various organizations to be discussed in this chapter are the European Political Community, 
European Council, European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community, European 
Defence Community and the Western European Union.    
44 Julian Lindley-French and Katja Flückiger, A Chronology of European Security & Defence 1945-
2005 (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2005), 17. 
45 Frederic Fransen. The Supranational Politics of Jean Monnet: Ideas and Origins of the European 
Community (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group Inc., 2001), 87–88. 
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(1) How was Europe going to accomplish integration, at least among the western 
European states? (2) How, if at all, should the United States fit into or relate to the new 
European identity? and (3) Could a European only identity counter the Soviet threat in 
Eastern Europe? This chapter examines several of the leading organizations of each kind 
of integration—political, economic, and defense—to show the drastic progression in 
Europe from a collection of fractious and periodically belligerent states to an integrating 
supra-national polity developing an identity of its own.  
A. POLITICAL INTEGRATION 
The sine qua non of European integration is political unity. Two early attempts in 
the postwar period to establish the foundation for political integration were the European 
Political Community and the European Council.  Some, such as Alcide De Gasperi of 
Italy, believed political integration to be a catalyst for and requirement of a European 
identity that would, in turn, beget economic and defense integration.46  
Political integration, however, is not without its limitations.  One extremely 
difficult political problem that must be addressed is the persistence of individual nation-
states in Europe.  As long as European countries continue to rely on the nation-state for a 
political identity a true collective and integrated European political identity will never be 
established.  The process of political integration attempts to answer the following 
questions:  
(1) Who belongs to Europe and who can be excluded? (2) Which values 
are genuinely (and uniquely) European? and (3) Is there a threat toward 
Europe and where does the threat come from—from within or from 
without? ... [A]nswers to such questions have immediate political 
consequences and begin to explain why the interpretation of the term 
‘Europe’ has been so disputed.47  
                                                 
46 Edward Fursdon, The European Defence Community: A History (New York, NY: St. Marin’s Press 
Inc, 1980), 214. 
47 Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen, The History of the Idea of Europe (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 1993), 83. 
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1. European Political Community 
The European Political Community was an idea proposed by Alcide de Gasperi of 
Italy in the early 1950s, in conjunction with the European Coal and Steel Community, 
with the belief that political organizations could provide the foundation and legitimacy 
for economic and defense integration endeavors.  At the core of this line of thinking was 
the belief that politics was the force that would ultimately bring together Europe’s 
economy and defense industries.48  The European Political Community was meant to be 
“an umbrella organization for the other communities,” namely the European Coal and 
Steel Community and the European Defence Community.  The major downfall and 
ultimate failure of the EPC owed to French fears of German rearmament and so the 
French parliament did not ratify the treaty to officially establish the EPC.49  
2. Council of Europe 
The initial five Brussels Treaty Powers50 along with Italy, Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark and Iceland officially established the Council of Europe on May 5, 1949, which 
also created under the Council a Consultative Assembly and a Council of Ministers via 
the Treaty of London.51  The goals the Council of Europe were to integrate Europe 
economically and politically.  Specifically, the Council was an attempt to merge 
numerous political parties in various countries throughout Europe in an attempt to create 
a European identity with one European political goal in mind.   
The desire of most delegates at the time was for the creation of a real 
European political authority…[but] this was impossible, so in compromise 
                                                 
48 The initial six countries involved were Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and West 
Germany—the “Europe of Six” of the original ECSC.  
49 Coling Hay and Anand Menon, European Politics (New York, NY: Oxford University Press Inc., 
2007), 156. 
50 The initial five powers that signed the Brussels Treaty on March 17, 1948 in Belgium were 
Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
51 Edward Fursdon, The European Defence Community: A History (New York, NY: St. Marin’s Press 
Inc, 1980), 17. 
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the members had to try and do what they could to pursue their goals within 
a body ’with limited functions and real powers.’52   
Europe was quickly realizing that a European identity would be extremely 
difficult to establish but was in fact a need in Europe.  The Council of Europe is another 
project, in the spirit of Gasperi, that begins with the idea that politics should lead 
integration efforts and that economic and defense integration, in theory, will logically 
follow.   
The Council was one of the first politically driven organizations after World War 
II with the primary aim of integrating Europe by creating a legitimate European political 
authority.  Many countries immediately requested membership to the Council of Europe 
because, according to Article 4, any European state could apply.  Moreover, “the Council 
of Europe seeks to develop throughout Europe common and democratic principles based 
on the European Convention on Human Rights and other reference texts on the protection 
of individuals.”53 Arguably the longevity and success of the Council of Europe is because 
membership is relatively open, provided an applicant country has stable democratic 
values and supports the protection of human rights. 
First and foremost the primary topic of concern among European countries was 
what to do with Germany, particularly the rearming of Germany.  The Council of Europe 
decided to allow Germany membership to the Council of Europe in July of 1950, less 
than a year after the Federal Republic gained full sovereignty and some five years before 
Germany officially acceded to NATO membership. Arguably if Germany was not 
granted membership and left on the outside looking in, resentment and discontent could 
have festered and have potentially caused further aggression—a redux of the Rapallo 
accord of 1926.54  The Council of Europe was also instrumental in another key area 
within Europe, human rights.  In particular the Council “provided a framework of 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 17. 
53 Council of Europe, “Council of Europe in Brief,” (n.d.), 
http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=quisommesnous&l=en (accessed April 1, 2012). 
54 Germany was left on the outside looking in after WWI within Europe.  The Rapallo Treaty of 1926 
was signed between Russia and Germany because other European countries wanted nothing to do with 
Germany.  Rapallo essentially unified Germany. 
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principles for the protection of human rights and key freedoms considered essential to a 
free and peaceful Europe.”55 Essentially any democratic state within Europe that supports 
and believes in human rights and peaceful resolution to conflicts can become a member 
of the Council of Europe.  One glaring success of the Council is that it did not succumb 
to the same fate as the European Political Community. It attempted to create a forum for 
each country to discuss issues of integration within the borders of Europe.    
B. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
Whereas the early efforts at politics-led European integration produced mixed 
results, rapprochement and cooperation came more readily in the economic realm.  Not 
least because of the requirements of postwar reconstruction, economics led the European 
agenda after World War II, notably the European Coal and Steel Community and the 
European Economic Community.  
1. European Coal and Steel Community 
The European Coal and Steel Community is the direct descendent and by-product 
of the European Political Community.  The European Political Community never was 
established because while Acide De Gasperi of Italy was lobbying for political 
integration, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman were working toward economic 
integration under the auspices of the European Coal and Steel Community.  The main 
goal of the ECSC was to put “production of those [coal and steel] resources under control 
of a supranational authority.”56 The European Coal and Steel Community and the 
European Political Community were both vying for support simultaneously.  Nation-
states viewed the European Political Community as an organization that would infringe 
on national sovereignty so support was very limited.  The European Coal and Steel 
Community, on the other hand, presented itself as an organization centered on economics  
 
                                                 
55 Andreas Staab, The European Union Explained (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2011), 
7. 
56 Rockwell A. Schanbel and Francis X. Rocca, The Next Superpower? The Rise of Europe and Its 
Challenge to the United States (Lanham, MD: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2005), 14. 
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that would not affect individual nation state’s sovereignty beyond the very circumscribed 
area of members’ coal and steel sectors.  In the end, the European Coal and Steel 
Community ultimately won out.   
To be sure, the European Coal and Steel Community included within itself a 
certain capacity for  
spill over, whereby international cooperation in one policy area leads to 
cooperation in related areas, often technical fields apparently of interest 
only to bureaucrats.  The result is that integrations takes place below the 
radar of most political discourse, and in some cases even contrary to the 
long-range aims of national leaders.57   
In the event, the European Coal and Steel Community did institutionalize 
“supranationalism [and] it [the ECSC] set a precedent and provided a framework for 
future integrative initiatives”58 such as the European Economic Community. 
One key legacy of the ECSC in terms of European integration was that it set 
events in motion toward the creation of a common market within Europe.  In order for a 
true European identity to be established, there must a system in place that allows for 
integration of goods, persons, services and capital; elements that the European Union 
today refers to as the Four Freedoms.59  The European Coal and Steel Community would 
later evolve and be known as the European Economic Community.  
2. European Economic Community 
The concept of economic integration that was started by the European Coal and 
Steel Community was advanced even farther under the European Economic Community 
(EEC).  The six founding countries of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands 
and West Germany that previously attempted to establish the European Political 
                                                 
57 Rockwell A. Schanbel and Francis X. Rocca, The Next Superpower? The Rise of Europe and Its 
Challenge to the United States (Lanham, MD: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2005), 14. 
58 Coling Hay and Anand Menon, European Politics (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
155. 
59 European Union, “Europa – The EU at a Glance - Eurojargon,” (n.d.), 
http://europa.eu/abc/eurojargon/index_en.htm (accessed February 8, 2012). 
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Community were truly establishing a common market.  Some of the goals that were set 
out by the European Economic Community were  
removal of all existing national customs duties and quantitative 
restrictions that hampered the import and export of goods between the 
member countries; the setting of a deadline for the establishment of a 
common customs union; the removal of all inter-Community obstacles to 
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital within the six-
area region; and the creation of a number of common EEC policies in such 
areas as agriculture, transportation, external trade and competition.60   
The concept of supranationalism that was previously set in motion by the 
European Coal and Steel Community was no longer restricted to the coal and steel 
markets.  The hopes of the six countries involved was that by establishing a stable 
integrated economic model that was functioning effectively other European countries 
would inevitably want to join thus expanding the common market throughout Europe. 
The importance of the European Economic Community and the establishment of 
the common market cannot be understated.  By linking numerous aspects of various 
countries’ economies, the foundation is set for the concept of pooling and sharing 
resources.  From the farmer harvesting crops to the politician deciding legislation, the 
countries are invariably linked across social classes. The European Economic 
Community was so instrumental in that it remained in effect and evolved into what was 
later referred to as the European Community up until 1993.  
C.  EUROPEAN DEFENSE INTEGRATION, 1947 – TODAY 
One area of integration that is extremely vital and covers both political and 
economic boundaries in Europe is the concepts of collective defense and military 
integration.   While political and economic integration have essentially stalled, defense 
integration has shown longevity and demonstrated real strides towards European 
integration.  The modern day European Union owes a very large portion of its current 
collective security identity to the structure of the Western European Union.  Most 
                                                 
60 Lousie B. van Tartwijk-Novey, The European House of Cards, Towards a United States of 
Europe?, (Houndmills, Basingstoke, London: MacMillan Press LTD, 1995) 18. 
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countries would agree that defense is an important aspect of integration but the manner in 
which that integration is achieved is a separate issue all together.  Politicians within one 
country can rarely, if ever, agree on how and what to spend their respective defense 
budgets on.  When multiple countries are involved, the problem of how to spend money 
on defense gets exponentially more difficult.  One question that needed to be answered 
by Europe was how to provide for its own collective security within its collective 
borders?  Making the issue of collective defense and security through a European identity 
even more difficult were the competing ideas and concepts of the newly established 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  Europe had already proven twice through World 
War I and World War II that it could not prevent or counter wars on the European 
continent without outside assistance from the United States.  Europe was eager to 
establish a European organization that did not involve the United States.  The European 
Defence Community and the Western European Union were the first two organizations 
that established the foundation for European defense integration while simultaneously 
advancing Europe’s political and economic interests.    
1. European Defence Community, 1950 – 1954  
Importance must be given to framing the Europe in which the European Defence 
Community was created.  Europe had just completed two very brutal and bloody World 
Wars that required the assistance of the United States and nobody wanted another war of 
annihilation.  One glaring goal of any organization needed to be an attempt to add 
security to an area that had historically demonstrated its instability. Europe was 
extremely fragile following the conclusion of World War II and the United States was 
arguably the only power physically able to match up against the Soviet military threat and 
create a balance of power in Europe.  Europe still attempted to create an organization that 
had a European identity that was driving European integration, the European Defence 
Community. 
One of the primary purposes of the European Defence Community to create an 
organization whose sole purpose was to provide for collective defense and security within 
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Europe while rearming Germany in a controlled environment without the involvement of 
the United States.  French Premier René Pleven who  
envisioned the eventual creation of a European army within which token 
German units would be included originated the concept.  The army would 
not be formed until a European decision-making framework had been 
established, with a European defense minister and a European parliament 
to approve funds for the operation.61   
The European Defence Community was attempting to integrate defense structures 
among European countries.  Early on Europe realized the importance of attempting to 
establish some sort of European defense identity.   
While some view the European Defence Community as a failure, looking at its 
accomplishments and legacies in a different context could change the perception of the 
organization.  Unfortunately the European Defence Community was ahead of its time. 
First and foremost the European Defence Community established the initial momentum 
required for integrating defense and security structures in and among European countries.  
In doing so the European Defence Community also was directly contributing to the 
establishment of a European identity.  Many of the ideas and concepts, such as collective 
defense and collective security that are cornerstones of the European Union, were 
originated under the European Defence Community. In the end, the European Defence 
Community suffered from poor timing and an overall lack of support due to the presence 
of the United States via NATO in Europe.      
2. Western European Union, 1954 – 2010 
After the European Defence Community lost its momentum the Western 
European Union was the next organization that attempted to complete European defense 
integration.  To accomplish the very difficult task of convincing Europeans and the 
United States that the Western European Union was a viable organization, a distinction 
was made between military alliances and European integration.  Konrad Adenauer the 
Chancellor of Germany summarizes the main premise behind the creation of the WEU; 
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“it [the WEU] was not by any means a primarily military alliance.  It is an instrument of 
European integration in all fields.”62  By portraying the Western European Union as an 
organization that was not competing for control of military assets European countries 
were more open to the concept.  NATO was now the only organization competing for and 
controlling military assets.  West Germany was accepted into NATO ending the Franco-
German hostility and rearmament concerns.63  NATO could now monitor West Germany 
and the WEU could focus on the strategy of unifying Europe.  The Western European 
Union allowed for a forum where the influence of the United States was not present. 
Unfortunately the Western European Union took a subordinate role to NATO and did not 
establish an effective and organized military structure.   
The WEU did provide a few key long term strategic benefits for Europe: (1) the 
Western European Union provided a channel of communication between major West 
European states that would help to strengthen European relationships without the 
influence of the United States, (2) American leadership in NATO was accepted from the 
1950s onward and the United States supported European economic integration via the 
WEU to help Europe one day better defend itself, (3) many European states widely 
agreed by the 1960s that Europe needed to speak with a more unified voice to project its 
influence on the world stage and (4) the WEU was more attractive to smaller countries 
that were not members of NATO but still wanted to identify with a European identity.64  
Ultimately, the WEU would still exist but essentially fall of the map until the 1980s 
because NATO was taking the lead and many Europeans still enjoyed the security 
guarantee provided by the United States under NATO.  The European Security Defence 
Identity and the Common Foreign and Security Policy can trace it roots all the way back 
to the European Defence Community and the Western European Union.  In the end, the 
Western European Union provided the foundation that would shape the future of the 
European Union and European integration across all levels.  
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D. CONCLUSION 
Integration efforts in Europe owe their genesis to the initial political and 
economic organizations established after World War II; presently, however, they reached 
a plateau and momentum was lost.  Politics attempted to implement policy that infringed 
on the sovereignty of the individual nation state.  In particular, political integration was 
schools of thought were “split between federalist plans from France and Belgium and 
more minimalist plans, in particular from Britain.  This split parallels the later difference 
between…political integration versus free trade” and politics did not shape a European 
supranational identity and lead integration efforts.65 In actuality, politics was more 
dividing Europe as opposed to integrating it.  Economic integration efforts on the other 
hand initially appeared by some, such as French Foreign Minister Schuman and Belgian 
Prime Minister Spaak, to be the answer to completing European integration.  
Unfortunately economic integration could not complete the task of European integration 
anymore than politics could.  France, under de Gaulle, did recognize the benefits to 
France’s economy and the potential to boost French industry but would not embrace the 
concept of supranationalism.66  As long as countries, such as France, are not willing to 
embrace the idea of supranationalism, political or economic efforts will always fail. 
Contrary to politics and economics defense integration efforts are founded on the 
idea of supranationalism.  Defense integration efforts made more sense because it 
provided answers and solutions to the following: (1) The demand by President Harry 
Truman for Western Europe to share the security burden and provide for its own security; 
(2) Answer the American demands for how Europe was going to address the future of 
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Germany’s military complex? and (4) How could Western Europe safely develop an 
effective strategy that integrated West German forces into the democratic structure of 
Western Europe?67   
Defense integration was the answer to all of these questions while establishing 
real growth toward European integration.  The importance of the defense sector in 
achieving the goal of European integration is evident still today with the bilateral attempt 
by Britain and France to create an aircraft carrier and by successes of European Union 
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IV. EUROPEAN NAVAL INTEGRATION EFFORTS: FAILURES 
AND SUCCESSES 
 Examination of two case studies will provide insight into what a European Navy 
might and might not look like.  The first case study is the failed bi-lateral attempt by 
France and Britain to create joint aircraft carriers to service both countries 
simultaneously.  While the intentions were good, the manner in which the concept was 
attempted was flawed.  The second case study takes a look at the successful Naval 
endeavor of European Union Naval Forces (EU NAVFOR) Somalia. EU NAVFOR 
Somalia is proof that a supranational navy is possible. When looking at the two case 
studies attention is given to the driving factors behind each endeavor and why in the end 
one failed and one succeeded.  Creation of a European Navy needs to be an endeavor led 
by the European Union because a couple or even a few countries cannot effectively 
accomplish the magnitude and scope of such a project.   
 Europe has more than 50,000 miles of coastline and a population that exceeds 500 
million people.  Separately, the twenty-seven individual member states within Europe 
combined have almost 600 ships.  Each nation is tasked with providing its own repair, 
maintenance, and logistics facilities.  While exact figures are not available as to how 
much this entire infrastructure costs to maintain, it is reasonable to assume that such 
outlays monopolize a large portion of each respective defense budget.  Looking just 
France’s, the United Kingdom’s, and Germany’s defense expenditures in 2004 they spent 
~$51 billion, ~$50 billion and ~$38 billion, respectively.68    
On the other hand, naval budgets still may not be at the levels needed, which 
accounts for the more or less chronic condition today of some ships not getting underway 
fully capable of completing the mission they were built for.  Bringing the respective 
naval infrastructure together makes sense in that it could lessen the burden of keeping a  
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navy in struggling countries such as Greece and Italy.  (To the extent that these states are 
also coastal powers, themselves, they can also expect to participate more in the combined 
security of the region.)   
Then considering that the United States announced its new focus is on the Asia 
Pacific theater, it makes all the more sense for Europe to pool and share its navy assets.  
In doing so, Europe would most likely emerge as the security provider around Europe 
while protecting its commerce.   
While Europe has yet to integrate its military forces, including its constituent 
navies, to such a degree, the foundations and conditions have been established for Europe 
to create a European Navy.  These bases have been wrought of experience—some 
helpful, some less than helpful.  The following pages analyze two such cases and draw 
conclusions for a future all-European Navy. 
A. FRANCO-BRITISH AIRCRAFT CARRIER 
In November 2010, the leadership of the United Kingdom and France, David 
Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy, respectively,69 officially announced the establishment of 
a fifty-year Franco-British treaty on defense and security with three specific strategic 
goals in mind: (1) establishment of a joint carrier group; (2) the creation a 10,000-person 
joint expeditionary force; and (3) the creation of joint nuclear testing facilities.70  The 
joint carrier group was going to be comprised of both French and British aircraft equally.  
The 10,000 person joint expeditionary forces was vague in that is merely stated a joint 
force for of 10,000 personnel.  One could logically assume that this would be split 5,000 
a piece but no exact force composition is outlined.  The last part about joint nuclear 
testing facilities might raise an eyebrow or two but both countries assure NATO and the 
United States that they will only “collaborate in the technology associated with nuclear  
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stockpile stewardship in support of our respective independent nuclear deterrent 
capabilities, in full compliance with our international obligations.”71  Then Cameron 
stated:  
Britain and France will be sovereign nations able to deploy our forces 
independently and in our national interest when we choose to do so. The 
two biggest defense budgets in Europe are recognizing that if we come 
together and work together we increase not just our joint capacity, but 
crucially we increase our own individual sovereign capacity so that we can 
do more things alone as well as together.72   
Unfortunately, this project was a less-than-exemplary bilateral effort by two of the 
EU's leading states—both major naval AND nuclear states, looking to combine efforts in 
these costly realms and, perhaps, to drag the rest of Europe along to greater cooperation 
and even union.  In the end, the Franco-British carrier seemed like an exercise in “great 
powers” acting like great powers, though disagreements between them on the 
fundamentals further doomed the effort from the inside, as well. 
France and Britain attempted to spark more interest in European integration 
through the creation of a joint aircraft carrier.  The initial idea was that they “could 
provide a road-map to more effective European defence cooperation, based on deeper 
capability planning and mutual dependency…[setting] a new ‘gold standard’ for defence 
cooperation.”73 Essentially there would be two aircraft carriers co-owned by Britain and 
France, with each state having possession of one.  The aircraft to be used on the carriers 
would be an “integrated strike force ensuring [both] French and British aircraft [could] 
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operate off both the planned new British carrier and the French carrier.”74  The problem 
is that this bilateral model envisions two sovereign militaries coming together 
periodically and in a limited fashion.  In this regard, the arrangement is, in the most 
benevolent view, akin to the ECSC—a sectorially limited bit of stepped-up cooperation 
among a limited number of participants. At worst, it marks an attempt by two of Europe’s 
major powers to hijack the union for their own—ill-defined—purposes. 
Second, the idea of sharing aircraft and carriers has the potential to save upfront 
and backend costs to both France and Britain while providing an overall increase in both 
countries’ respective sea power capabilities.  Initially, pooling their respective money for 
research and development would mean no duplication of effort.  In addition, the return on 
investment by both nations would be much higher than if France and Britain pursued new 
carriers and planes independently.  On the back end, money could be saved because 
maintenance facilities could be standardized in France and Germany for both carriers and 
all aircraft expanding the potential operating range of both.  The expanded maintenance 
and repair facilities could also create an economic boost with jobs and resources in the 
respective regions as well.  These European carriers could provide projection of power 
from the sea in the Pacific where nations like India and China are also investing in carrier 
technology.75  The problem with this line of thinking is that it also excludes everyone 
else in the EU.  Involving other EU countries would actually benefit the carrier project as 
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One of the larger reasons for the failure of the bilateral agreement between France 
and Britain is that the endeavor did not have a European basis.  The costs and the benefits 
accrued exclusively to Britain and France, despite the optimistic rhetoric about 
integration and regional security.  The rest of Europe would essentially be excluded, 
which begs the question: What about the smaller countries within Europe?  Europe is not 
just comprised of such “great powers” as France and Britain.  Other coastal states surely 
have their own interests and assets that they would want to bring to such a grand project.  
Similarly, smaller countries that lack the facilities or industrial base to create a navy on 
their own could potentially want buy-in—a supranational European navy would protect 
their economic and security interests, as well.  Both France and Britain are members of 
the European Union and as such the new carriers could one day be called upon to defend 
European interests.   
While the intent was to appear as though the agreement benefits Europe as a 
whole, the perception is much different.  Cameron’s speechifying sounds as though 
British and French interests come before Europe’s.  The potential to create division 
among European countries rather eclipses any hope for unity through such an 
undertaking.  In this sense, it works directly at odds with the whole history of European 
integration since 1950. 
Another reason for the failure of the project is because the European defense 
market is fragmented.  Basically “progress has been made in some elements of aerospace 
and particularly in complex weapons, other areas such as armored vehicles and maritime 
procurement remain inefficient.”76  Europe has not established a collective identity that 
supports integration of military capabilities, assets and resources.  The fragmentation was 
evident in France and Britain’s inability to agree on something as simple as the 
propulsion system that was to be installed in the new carriers.  On the one side, Britain 
adamantly opposes the use of nuclear propulsion in its navy vessels because of the 
associated costs and risks.  France, however, uses nuclear propulsion in its submarine 
force and on the carrier Charles de Gaulle and is comfortable in its application.  Britain 
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will most likely never change its views on utilizing nuclear technology to power their 
fleet.  Both sides entered into the agreement already understanding the other’s position 
regarding propulsion systems.  Because France already utilizes nuclear power, it would 
most likely view a conventional powered nuclear carrier as a step back rather than a step 
forward regarding technological advances. Of course, while France and Britain never 
even attempted to square the circle of nuclear propulsion between them, one hardly needs 
to mention that the disagreement would rage all the more fiercely if the rest of Europe 
were to gain a voice in it.77 
While the bilateral agreement was established under the auspices of promoting 
EU integration, the EU was never involved in the process.  Instead, two “great powers” 
proceeded in a manner more suited for 1950—or perhaps even 1820.  France, Britain, and 
other larger powers in Europe must realize that times have changed.  Europe requires 
solutions that at least acknowledge the treaty structure from 1992 onwards, which 
encompasses all of the EU. 
B. EUROPEAN UNION NAVAL FORCES SOMALIA 
One successful operational naval command that demonstrates the importance of 
European naval integration is EU NAVFOR Somalia conducting Operation Atalanta.  
The command was officially established in December 2008, in accordance with a United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate, and has been approved through December 
2014 with the following strategic objectives:  
(1) Protect vessels of the World Food Programme, humanitarian aid and 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) shipping; (2) Help deter, 
prevent, and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery; (3) Protect 
vulnerable shipping; and (4) Monitor fishing activities off the coast of 
Somalia.78   
                                                 
77 Jolyon Howorth, “Transatlantic Relations,” in European Politics, ed. Colin Hay and Anand Menon 
(Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press,2007), 420. 
 
78 EU NAVFOR Somalia, “EU NAVFOR Somalia - Mission,” http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-
us/mission (accessed April 29, 2012). 
 39
According to an article in the New York Times on May 15, 2012 an EU attack 
helicopter was launched from an undisclosed location with one objective: to attack and 
destroy pirate skiffs at one of the Somali pirate bases of operations.  The mission was 
executed flawlessly, by all accounts.  This attack operation by EU forces demonstrates  
the resolve and willingness of European forces to take necessary measures on the high 
seas to protect international shipping.  Also of note, the New York Times article mentions 
that  
this year the piracy business seems to have taken a hit. Though Somali 
pirates are still holding about a dozen vessels and several hundred crew 
members, that figure is sharply reduced from a few years ago, when the 
pirates had dozens of captured ships under their control and nearly 1,000 
seamen to ransom.79   
What changed off the coast of Somalia a few years ago?  The EU established 
Operation Atalanta.      
The success of Operation Atalanta owes to several factors.  The first reason for 
EU NAVFOR’s success is the structure of the command and control (C2) element.  The 
current Operational Commander is Rear Admiral Duncan L. Potts of the United 
Kingdom; the Deputy Operational Commander is Rear Admiral Rainer Endres of 
Germany, and the Force Commander is Rear-Admiral Jean-Baptiste Dupuis of France.80  
By ensuring there are different European countries in positions of leadership there is not 
the perception that Atalanta is just another operation conducted by one specific country 
while giving the operation more of an integrated European identity.  A country diverse 
C2 architecture also prevents one country from completely running the operation. 
Country diverse Command and Control is not a new concept.  NATO has been utilizing 
this structure since its inception.81   
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The composition of the operational forces that comprise Operation Atalanta are 
just as diverse and just as vital to the success of the mission.  EU NAVFOR Somalia 
usually has anywhere between four and seven surface combatants and three to four 
maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) assigned with a total manning level of around 
1500 personnel.82  Currently, the following countries have ships and/or aircraft that are 
deployed in support of Operation Atalanta: France with three ships and one aircraft, 
Spain with two ships and one aircraft, Germany with one ship and one aircraft, 
Netherlands with one ship, Portugal with one ship, Italy with one ship and Luxembourg 
with two aircraft.83  The multi-state face of the operational units is a testament to 
Europe’s naval forces willingness and capability to effectively work together.  
Building further on the concept of diversity within the composition of forces is 
the differing manner in which countries are able and permitted to contribute.  The EU 
decided that non-member states could contribute, as they so desired allowing for 
countries such as Norway, Croatia, and Ukraine to contribute staff officers to the 
operational headquarters despite their lack of membership in the European Union.84  
Budget contributions are another way that countries are able to contribute aside from 
forces.  The budget  
is shared—via the Athena Mechanism85—between the EU Member States, 
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costs for the Operational Headquarters (Northwood – UK) and the Force 
Headquarters (onboard the Flagship), as well as medical services and 
transport.86   
Operational costs on the other hand associated with supplying “military assets and 
personnel are shared by the contributing states according to their involvement in the 
operation, with each state bearing the cost of the resources it deploys.”87  The EU 
realized early that countries in Europe, whether members of the EU or not, have a vested 
interest in protecting economic shipping while countering piracy on the high seas.  The 
EU NAVFOR structure accommodates such participation and integrates these 
contributions into a successful strategic undertaking.   
C. CONCLUSION 
The Franco-British bilateral navy/defense agreement that attempted to spark 
European integration was flawed from the beginning.  Something as big and forward-
leaning as a supranational navy cannot be the exclusive project of just two countries, 
even if they are both major maritime powers.  Clearly, France and Britain saw the 
importance of developing a navy that could combine forces and specialties, spread 
burdens and costs, and simultaneously encourage further European integration.  The 
larger ideas and themes associated with the treaty between France and Britain simply 
need to be applied at the European Union level.    
EU NAVFOR Somalia has already established itself as a success, proving that 
European countries’ navies can operate together.   EU NAVFOR has succeeded in 
provided security in and around the Horn of Africa while simultaneously combating 
piracy.  Specific accomplishments include having a 100 percent success rate while 
providing escorts to World Food Programme (WFP) vessels delivering humanitarian aid 
to Somali people, providing protection to African Union Mission on Somalia (AMISOM) 
shipments, has ensured the protection of other vulnerable shipping within the 
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Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) all the while providing over 
280 million euro in financial assistance to Somalia’s governance, education and 
economic development.88  Operations conducted by the European Union in the Horn of 
Africa have given Europe’s naval forces legitimacy on the international stage.  Europe 
now must take the next step and not just operate together but rather create a supranational 
navy because they can ill afford to fall behind rival powers such as North Korea and 
China who are actively pursuing a larger navy.  
                                                 
88 EU NAVFOR Somalia, “EU NAVFOR Somalia - Mission,” http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-
us/mission (accessed April 30, 2012). 
 43
V. EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY AS A MODEL—
INSTITUTIONALIZING THE GOOD 
 How can such an ambitious and complicated endeavor as a European Navy, be 
accomplished?  This institutionalization of the good is arguably the primary concern for 
people who subscribe to the one-world view or the uncertain view of Europe.  Both views 
would contend that such an ambitious endeavor could not be accomplished because of the 
persistence of the nation state—and the belief that individual nation-states would not be 
willing to give up the sovereignty of their respective military assets.  Also both views 
would contend that Europe’s history is too complicated to truly integrate because of the 
numerous wars and conflicts that have been conducted on the continent between various 
countries.  In addition, the one-world view would see a European Navy as a duplicative 
effort because of the existence and effectiveness of NATO and the United States.   
The reality is that a successful and similar model is already in place in the 
European Space Agency.  The ESA makes a useful comparison because space 
exploration, like a Navy, entails high-cost, high-profile projects that speak to security and 
economic concerns as well as the prestige and power of the polity that promotes it.  For 
all of these reasons, European states of all sizes have various interests in the undertaking, 
necessitating a mechanism that allows various levels of participation in a given program 
(in return for a commensurate share of the glory and/or profit).  The R&D that goes with 
space exploration, as with a navy, ramifies within the society that sponsors it, so this 
aspect of both undertakings is important, as well.  Finally, the ESA is successful as an 
administrative body and as a system of practices.  For all these reasons, the ESA offers a 
model of participation by which the EU also could fashion and sustain a common Navy 
that builds on the positive experiences of EU NAVFOR in Somalia. 
A. WHO IS IN? 
The ESA is a voluntary organization.  Only those countries that wish to 
participate contribute time, materiel, money, and/or expertise to any given project.  There 
are basically two types of members within the ESA, full members and cooperating states.  
Then there are those countries that simply have observer status within the ESA.  Full 
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members are just as the term implies; they have complete access to all technologies and 
advancements with a large share of revenue returned to respective state in the form of 
industrial contracts.  Cooperating states on the other hand have access to all technologies 
and advancements but have less of a percentage returned in industrial contracts.  Then 
there are those who have been granted observer status on ESA’s Council.  Full and 
cooperative member states determine ESA’s future endeavors while observers are simply 
there to take note about the direction of the ESA.89  For example, all ESA members agree 
to pay X-percent of their respective individual GDP for the common budget covering 
things like building operating costs, employee salaries, etc. Then when it comes time 
actually to build a rocket, France determines that it wants the lead on building the 
propulsion system (nuclear or otherwise).  In return, France is expected to provide the 
largest portion of money toward the research and development.  In the process, a 
company that builds rocket engines in France would be awarded the contract for building 
the engine.     
Applying the ESA model to creating a European Navy would be fairly 
straightforward.  There can be those states that want to participate as full members and 
those that want to participate as cooperative members.  Then there would be a provision 
to allow those that just want observer status to understand the future and vision of the 
European Navy.  For example, imagine that the proposed EU Navy decides it wants to 
build an aircraft carrier.  Immediately what comes to mind is that the larger naval powers 
within the EU, like Britain and France, would want to take the lead.  Smaller countries, 
like Spain, Greece and Italy, could not afford to take the lead but would understand the 
strategic implications of power projection and presence on the high seas.  In turn, Spain, 
Greece, and Italy would then provide combat aircraft to fill the decks of the new aircraft 
carriers, while the other EU countries could assist in providing manning.   
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The main difference here is that this example is an endeavor that has collective 
buy-in.  In keeping the organization voluntary, countries do not feel as though they are 
excluded from the concept of an integrated European identity.  Effectively, everyone in 
the EU is included—and represented. 
B. LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE 
According to ESA’s website, the space agency’s C2 is structured as follows:   
The Council is ESA's governing body and provides the basic policy 
guidelines within which ESA develops the European space programme. 
Each Member State is represented on the Council and has one vote, 
regardless of its size or financial contribution.  ESA is headed by a 
Director General who is elected by the Council every four years. Each 
individual research sector has its own Directorate and reports directly to 
the Director General.90 
Then regarding the relationship between the EU and ESA, the website notes: 
The European Union … and ESA share a common aim: to strengthen 
Europe and benefit its citizens. While they are separate organisations, they 
are increasingly working together towards common objectives. Some 20 
per cent of the funds managed by ESA now originate from the EU budget. 
[and] 
The legal basis for the EU/ESA cooperation is provided by a Framework 
Agreement which entered into force in May 2004. Under this agreement 
the European Commission and ESA coordinate their actions through the 
Joint Secretariat, a small team of EC’s administrators and ESA executive. 
The Member States of the two organisations meet at ministerial level in 
the Space Council, which is a concomitant meeting of the EU and ESA 
Councils, prepared by Member States representatives in the High-level 
Space Policy Group (HSPG).91 
Applying this same leadership framework for a European Navy would benefit all 
involved as well.  Creating something such as a European Naval Council to administer 
and focus naval strategic efforts would be very effective.  Size of participating country or 
                                                 
90 European Space Agency “ESA Space For Europe – All About ESA,” 
http://www.esa.int/SPECIALS/About_ESA/SEMW16ARR1F_0.html (accessed May 15, 2012). 
91 European Space Agency, “ESA Space For Europe – ESA and the EU,” 
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the amount of money that is contributed should not be a factor in determining voting 
rights.  Every full member that contributes gets one equal vote in the direction, 
deployment of naval forces and budget expenditures.   
C. BUDGET 
In space-faring and sea-faring alike, the budget is usually one of the biggest points 
of contention whenever any type of joint or multinational project is attempted.  It is also 
the single greatest obstacle to entry for many states, particularly the smaller ones. ESA’s 
website puts the agency’s 2012 budget is a little over four billion Euros, compared to 
NASA’s budget of just over 15 billion Euros and Russia’s space budget of approximately 
3 billion Euros.  While ESA is lagging behind the United States monetarily, its funding is 
ahead of the Russian Space Agency that has been around at least as long as NASA.  The 
relatively young ESA finds itself right in the middle.   
ESA has developed a rather simple approach to determine how much each 
member state is required to contribute.  In order to keep contributions relatively equal, 
they are based on percentage of gross domestic product.  The budget of ESA is broken 
down as follows: 
‘Mandatory’ and ‘Optional’. Programmes carried out under the General 
Budget and the Science Programme budget are ‘mandatory’; they include 
the agency’s basic activities (studies on future projects, technology 
research, shared technical investments, information systems and training 
programmes).  All Member States contribute to these programmes on a 
scale based on their Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The other 
programmes, known as ‘optional’, are only of interest to some Member 
States, who are free to decide on their level of involvement.  Optional 
programmes cover areas such as Earth observation, telecommunications, 
satellite navigation and space transportation. Similarly, the International 
Space Station and microgravity research are financed by optional 
contributions.92  
By dividing programs up between mandatory and optional, ESA ensures a base of 
common level interest items that pertain to everything ESA does.  Providing facilities, 
                                                 
92 European Space Agency, “ESA Space For Europe – Funding,” 
http://www.esa.int/SPECIALS/About_ESA/SEMNQ4FVL2F_0.html (accessed May 15, 2012). 
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paying its personnel, maintaining the facilities, and building launchers would fall under 
the mandatory pot of money.  Since all full members pay a flat percentage based on their 
respective individual GDP, the mandatory costs are relatively split equally.  ESA’s 
budget process alleviates one country from incurring the majority of the financial burden. 
Using ESA’s budget as a model, creating a Navy might look something like the 
following:  Mandatory programs would involve areas such as hull design and general 
shipboard systems such as damage control communications.  Optional systems would 
include anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare and anti-surface warfare systems.  These 
lists are by no means all inclusive but just illustrative in the sense that all ships have 
common systems and then there are specialty systems that require additional research and 
development.  The ESA model applied to the Navy would solve the problem because 
those that want to develop more complex systems for the EU would therefore volunteer 
and take the lead.  
D. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D) 
Last but not least is how the money is to be spent.  A collective strategy will 
foster and develop technology and capabilities as countries share technology.  As with 
everything else the ESA has devised a method to keep things fair between all countries 
financially involved within the organization.  The concept used is referred to as “fair 
return.”  The ESA policy is as follows: 
Member states invest a little under €3 billion annually through ESA, and a 
similar amount in national programmes.  ESA programmes are governed 
by the industrial policy principles established in the ESA Convention, in 
particular by exploiting competitive bidding while distributing industrial 
contracts in proportion to funding from Member States (“fair return”).  
This provided governments an incentive to invest in European R&D space 
programmes and may contribute to maintaining competing suppliers 
within Europe, limiting the risk associated with the emergence of 
monopolies.  It has enabled the leveraging of funds, competitive industries 
and the convergence of national priorities.  It has, however, limited 
rationalization of facilities within prime contractors and limited 
specialization among suppliers of subsystems.  With the objective to 
improve further the efficiency, specialization and competitiveness of 
European industry and after an assessment of the most recent reform, the 
process of introducing additional flexibility into the ESA rules should 
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continue to develop, taking into account in particular the anticipated 
expansion of ESA’s membership.93  
Essentially the concept of “fair return” rewards those countries that invest more 
money in a given technology by giving that respective country the industrial contract to 
build and develop the corresponding technology.  Applying these R&D concepts to 
developing a European Navy would allow for economic growth and return on investment 
through industrial contracts as illustrated earlier with the aircraft carrier example. 
E. CONCLUSION 
If Europe wants to establish itself on the international stage as a superpower then 
now is the time to invest in the creation of a European navy.  In doing so, Europe would 
benefit by developing Sea Control through blue water capabilities that could potentially 
support an overall European Maritime Strategy.  Europe’s Maritime Strategy in turn 
would include concepts that impact the continent as whole such as Expeditionary 
Operations and the development and sharing of capabilities and technologies among 
European countries.  The ESA has proven that Europe can accomplish integration via an 
organization that has established membership criteria, complex command and control, 
established budget criteria and effective research and development that supports future 
expansion.  The ESA has also illustrated Europe’s willingness to establish formal and 
informal agreements as needed in keeping with the best interests of Europe as a whole.  







                                                 
93 Jean-Jacques Dordain, Resolution on the European Space Policy: ESA Director General’s Proposal 
for the European Space Policy, (The Netherlands: ESA Communications, 2007), 30. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
Opinions differ about what the future holds for Europe, specifically European 
integration.  Whether someone subscribes to the two-world view where Europe and the 
United States develop as separate and equal partners, the one-world view where Europe 
and the United States work together to achieve Western security and defense together or 
the uncertain-view where Europe must provide for its own security but are unsure if it 
can is irrelevant.  Given the current austerity measures that are a result of the ongoing 
financial crisis European countries will have to pool their resources.  Whether or not 
individual countries in Europe will admit their dependence on each other does not matter.   
The truth is they are all very interconnected and have various supporting and 
supported type relationships with each other.  Today  
self-sufficiency is not a [condition] to which nations can reasonably aspire 
in the modern world…[where] economic interdependence is the 
norm…[and] the new world order is governed by transnationalism and 
globalization, two factors which lead to a much greater mutual 
interdependence…measures of wealth, or rank, of nations.94   
There are currently twenty-seven different countries that comprise the EU each 
with their own philosophy on defense spending as it pertains to their respective individual 
budgets. The total combined 2011 defense budget of all twenty-seven individual EU 
countries was roughly $326 billion compared to $711 billion for the United States.95  By 
combining their respective defense budgets, the states of Europe could enjoy a vast 
potential to developing a European integrated defense plan centered on the creation of a 
European Navy. 
While in the past political and economic organizations attempted to lead the way 
toward European integration, they inevitably lost their momentum.  Political integration 
efforts were undermined by the persistence of the nation state.  European countries were 
                                                 
94 Peter Hore, “The Strategy of Choice,” in Dimensions of Seapower: Strategic choice in the Modern 
World, ed. Eric Grove and Peter Hore (Hull, UK: The University of Hull Press,1998), 3. 
95 Data was taken from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute at 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex, (accessed May 19,2012). 
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not ready to give up any portion of their individual sovereignty.  Politics essentially 
created more division as opposed to integration within Europe.  Economic integration had 
just as many problems because while the French supported and encouraged economic 
integration, they would not sign on to the concept of supranationalism.  Defense 
integration efforts, on the other hand, have been steady driving force since the early 
1950s founded on the concept of supranationalism.  Looking back at the problems of 
burden sharing, West German rearmament and integrating West Germany back into 
Western Europe defense integration was the logical answer.   
The recent attempt by France and Britain to build two aircraft carriers illustrates 
that countries still today believe in the concepts embodied within defense integration. 
Unfortunately, while France and Britain had good intentions, the manner in which they 
attempted to implement their idea was flawed.  First and foremost, France and Britain 
were using old-style thinking that was prevalent in Europe after WWII.  Basically larger 
countries essentially dictated policy to the smaller countries.  In addition, too many issues 
were left unresolved, such as the type of propulsion plant to be used or how and when 
would they be used during times of conflict.   
Countries are less willing to give up their individual naval assets to another 
country but, instead, would rather release them to a higher authority for the greater good.  
Operation Atalanta off the coast of Somalia illustrates the willingness of European 
countries to allocate forces in support of Europe’s strategic interests.  The multi-country 
composition of Operation Atalanta’s forces and leadership prove that Europe is able to 
agree on how to allocate and command forces from different countries while falling 
under a higher authority.   A supranational navy would essentially have a similar 
command and force structure. 
Through various integration efforts Europe has essentially attempted to achieve 
superpower status.  Subscribing to the ideas of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Europe first must 
invest in seapower.  Through the development of a more robust blue water force, Europe 
would achieve a high level of sea control and presence in and around Europe.  Europe 
would be able to provide security within international shipping lanes ensuring its 
economic growth while simultaneously providing force presence in European waters.  By 
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default, creating a Navy would also necessitate the creation of a European Maritime 
Strategy facilitating the idea of unity of effort.  Also, development of a maritime strategy 
would identify areas for improvement and address capability limitations. Unfortunately, 
by no fault of their own, numerous countries within Europe have very limited naval 
capabilities and therefore unity of effort is very difficult.  While some countries have 
capable and robust naval forces others struggle with rather simple and somewhat 
fundamental tasks.  As Europe develops blue water forces that are more capable in 
support of a larger European maritime strategy, expeditionary operations will become 
routine.  Europe will be able to deploy naval forces on short notice for long periods of 
time to foreign countries at the direction of a supranational authority.  Per the ideas and 
concepts of Mahan, Europe will therefore be recognized as a superpower.  
With why established, the only other question was how?  The European Space 
Agency provides a logical and simple template to follow to create a European Navy.  The 
ESA has provided answers to the problems of who is involved, command and control, 
money and research and development.  Modeling a European Navy after ESA would be 
rather simple:  Create a European Naval Council with equal representation from all 
countries that wish to directly participate.  Then offer cooperative membership or 
observer status to others as needed.  Formal and informal agreements can be examined on 
a case-by-case basis.  Because every country within the EU is involved in some form or 
fashion with the ESA, logic would dictate that all EU countries would be involved in 
some way with a European Navy.  Budget and R&D would follow the same principle of 
“fair return” as developed in the ESA.  All countries involved would provide funding for 
standard budget expenses such as fuel, food, port services and universal shipboard 
systems.  Those willing to invest more money would do more elaborate systems and 
research and in return they would be awarded the corresponding industrial contracts.   
Also there are additional political and economic benefits as well.  The potential 
economic boost to all European economies in the form of military contracts is 
exponential.  The more a country invests, the more return on investment it achieves.  
Benefits will be in the form of jobs and industry that supports the building and 
maintenance of ships.  From a political standpoint as ships operate in and around Europe, 
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they will conduct port visits assisting in European integration.  As more of Europe is 
involved in the creation, maintenance and support of a European Navy people will start to 
identify with it.  As more ships fly the EU flag, other nations will take note of Europe’s 
presence giving rise to Europe’s legitimacy as a superpower.   
Whether or not the EU fulfills its potential as a superpower in every 
respect, it remains our [the United States’] natural and indispensable 
partner…Europe and America constitute a community of interests and 
values, which it is our challenge to transform into a community of 
action.96   
The contention here is that the EU is capable of achieving legitimacy as a 
superpower.  Today is a new day and circumstances have changed for Europe.   
Operational (the lessons from Libya), structural (austerity and the 
challenges arising from a mutli-polar world) and the strategic pressures 
(re-orientation of US strategic interests towards the Asia-Pacific region) 
force European allies to upgrade and maintain hard security capacities 
without impacting on wobbly national budgets.97 
The logical, economic and realistic method for Europe to achieve these hard 
security capacities is through the concept of pooling and sharing.  The current term that is 
used for the idea of pooling and sharing is Smart Defence. The logic is sound and the 
framework is established, now is the time for Europe and the EU to act.  The successes of 
the European Space Agency and the gaining momentum of Smart Defence proves that the 
question that needs to be asked now is not “Why a European Navy?” but rather “Why not 
a European Navy?” 
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